A concentração do poder de controle nas Sociedades Anônimas e os mecanismos de atenuação desse poder: o voto múltiplo e o voto em separado

Abstract

This work deals with the importance of separate voting and multiple voting as a mechanism to mitigate the power of control in public limited companies. It aimed to address the difference between separate and multiple votes in the law of public limited companies and how the right to vote is regulated by Brazilian law. The types of control present in companies and the history of the power of control present in public limited companies were also conceptualized. Finally, the decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding the separate and multiple votes and the business conflicts arising from them were analyzed. For that, the concept and the legal nature of separate and multiple voting in companies will be analyzed. Considering the proposed objectives, the methodology will be bibliographic, carrying out a corporate, doctrinal and jurisprudential legislative analysis of the Securities and Exchange Commission. It is based on the theoretical framework of legal institutionalism, which is very present in the Brazilian business reality. The result obtained was that sufficient means are not sufficient and effective for the deconcentration of the control power, incurring a concentrated and not dispersed or dispersed capital structure.