Marx, os marxismos e a crise: a lei tendencial da queda da taxa de lucro e as determinações subjacentes da crise do capital na contemporaneidade

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the causes of the recurring crises in the capitalist process of production and reproduction. In dialogue with the work of Marx and his contemporary interpreters, we argue that the crisis cannot be reduced to issues related to neoliberal regulation or financialization after the 1970s. Contrary to this type of analysis, we emphasize the need to consider the events of the 2008 global economic crisis in connection with the underlying determinations that shaped the movement of capital since the 1970s, especially in the United States, the epicenter of the crisis. We argue that the fundamental cause of the 2008 crisis lies in the intensification of the contradiction between the development of the productive forces of social labor and the capitalist social relations of production. This contradiction is evidenced by the decline in the general rate of profit of U.S. corporations from 1973 to 2008. We oppose Ricardian-type analyses, such as that of Nobuo Okishio, which unilaterally attribute the fall in the rate of profit to rising wages as the sole factor. In our view, the rate of profit tends to fall as a consequence of the expansion of the productive forces of social labor, the growth of relative surplus value, and, consequently, the increase in productivity under the domination of capital. Furthermore, we show that the U.S. government's response to crises since the 1970s—through a combination of credit system expansion, fictitious capital, and financial liberalization—was not capable of restoring the high growth and accumulation rates of the post-World War II period. Rather, it merely postponed the problem through widespread indebtedness and the formation of short-lived speculative booms and bubbles. Thus, in dialogue with Kliman, we contend that neoliberalism and financialization should not be seen unilaterally as the causes of the 2008 crisis, but rather as policy responses to the relative stagnation of the U.S. economy since the crisis of the 1970s. The absence of significant capital destruction between 1973 and 2008 prevented the establishment of the conditions necessary for the recovery of economic growth, investment, and employment. Finally, we conclude that crises are inherent to the movement of capital and, in this sense, inevitable as long as capitalism endures. The various economic policies implemented by states are only capable of postponing problems, increasing instability, and creating conditions for more severe crises. In this regard, the analysis of the 2008 crisis helps to reveal, on the one hand, the inherent limits of capital itself as a social relation of surplus value production, and, on the other hand, the historical necessity of its replacement by higher forms of social labor organization.