A originalidade de Tomás de Aquino: finitude, realismo moderado e a fundamentação causal do conhecimento humano

Abstract

This dissertation investigates the originality of Thomas Aquinas’s thought from the standpoint of his epistemology, understood within a broader philosophy of knowledge deeply marked by the finitude of the human intellect. It assumes that, in Aquinas, knowing is not characterized by the full and immediate possession of truth, but by a rational itinerary proper to the creature, who apprehends reality in a progressive, mediated, and limited manner. In this sense, finitude does not appear as an accidental obstacle to knowledge, but as a constitutive condition of its very possibility. The study initially examines Aquinas’s philosophical and theological method, with particular attention to the structure of the quaestio and to the role of disputatio in the organization of knowledge. It then analyzes Aquinas’s conception of truth and the moderate realism that grounds his theory of knowledge, highlighting the relationship between the human intellect, created reality, and the divine intellect. Subsequently, the foundations of theologia naturalis and sacra doctrina are investigated, clarifying the distinction—without separation—between reason and revelation in the cognitive process. Finally, the dissertation addresses the metaphysical and ethical implications of Aquinas’s epistemology, showing how its structure supports an anthropology of limitation and an ethics oriented toward beatitude. It is thus argued that Aquinas’s originality lies neither in a rupture with the preceding philosophical tradition nor in a mere synthesis of inherited elements, but in a conceptual reconfiguration of the problem of knowledge through the articulation of truth, finitude, and the intelligibility of reality, thereby conferring a distinctive unity and coherence upon his philosophy.